

# Optimal Selection of Crowdsourcing Workers Balancing their Utilities and Platform Profit

MS Thesis Defense

Presented By:

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Exam Roll: 1314 (2015 - 2016)

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# Presentation Outline

- Introduction
- Research Challenges and Motivation
- Related Work
- Contribution
- Proposed System
- Performance evaluation
- Summary of the thesis

# Crowdsourcing

- Distributed problem solving model
- Outsources tasks to the crowd
  - Online community
  - Easy for human, difficult for computer
- Innovation
- Problem solving
- Efficiency



# Mobile Crowdsourcing

## Smartphone


- ubiquitous
- seamless Internet connectivity (e.g., Wi-Fi, cellular, etc.)
- multi sensing capabilities




Mixing smartphone based mobile technologies and crowdsourcing offers a new paradigm called **Mobile Crowdsourcing (MCS)**

[12] “Mobile technology fact sheet,” Available online: <http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet>, accessed on 17 November 2017.

# Players in MCS



# An Example of MCS System





# Some MCS Applications

- Traffic monitoring and smart navigation
  - Nerichel[3], Vtrack[4]
- Environmental monitoring
  - PIER[2], EarPhone[5]
- Social networking
  - crowdSMILE[28]
- Disaster Reporting
  - Project Jagriti[25]

# Challenges in MCS

- Decomposing service request into subtasks
- Considering workers spatial and temporal availability
- Controlling sensing quality
- Making sufficient profit from the MCS system
- Trade-off issues (e.g., profit quality trade-off)
- Data quality assessment
- Lucrative payment policy for the workers
- Managing past sensing reputation



# Research Questions


- How to **maximize quality of sensed data** while fixing a profit margin of the platform?
- How to **maximize profit of a platform** while keeping the required quality of sensed data for MCS applications?
- How to **make a reasonable trade-off** in between the above two performance metrics?

# State-of-the-Art-Works

# PROMOT Mechanism [39]

Greedy selects worker with a aim to maximize platform profit

Provide satisfactory reward to the winners



Do not consider worker's location or mobility


Tasks are considered atomic

Do not consider worker past sensing reputation

[ 39] H. Shah-Mansouri and V. W. S. Wong, “**Profit maximization in mobile crowdsourcing: A truthful auction mechanism,**” in 2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), June 2015, pp. 3216-3221.

# SACRM System [36]

Consider worker's social attribute, task completion delay and reputation



Report assessment and rewarding scheme

Profit of the platform is not considered

Do not consider worker mobility or location


Can't handle heterogeneous task request

[ 36] J. Ren, Y. Zhang, K. Zhang, and X. S. Shen, “Sacrm: Social aware crowdsourcing with reputation management in mobile sensing,” Computer Communications, vol. 65, pp. 55 - 65, 2015, mobile Ubiquitous Sensing from Social Network Viewpoint.

# MSC System [46]


Consider Two patterns :  
continuous and Discontinuous

Selects workers with a aim to minimize social cost



Worker location, mobility or past sensing reputation are not considered

Can't handle heterogeneous task request




[46] Z. Duan, M. Yan, Z. Cai, X. Wang, M. Han, and Y. Li, "Truthful incentive mechanisms for social cost minimization in mobile crowdsourcing systems," *Sensors*, vol. 16, no. 4, 2016.

# Thesis Contributions


- Designed a **workload allocation framework** for MCS platform named **PQ-Trade system**.
- Defined worker utility based on its **mobility, current location** and **past sensing reputations**.
- Allocation problem is formulated as **MONLP** problem
  - Proven to be **NP-Hard**
- Developed two **greedy** solutions
  - First fit **utility maximization**
  - First fit **profit maximization**
- A **payment policy** for the selected worker
- Performance evaluation of the algorithms and comparison with existing techniques

# System Model







# Interaction among Entities




# Computational Model of PQ - Trade Platform



# Receiving Sensing Task Request



# Workload Computation




- Each task is divided into subtasks of **uniform size**.
- Total number of subtasks is defined as **workload** of that task
- For **heterogeneous service request** subtask definition can be more **complex**
  - Introduces another research problem [62]

[62] S. Chen, M. Liu, and X. Chen, "A truthful double auction for two-sided heterogeneous mobile crowdsensing markets," *Computer Communications*, vol. 81, no. Complete, pp. 31-42, 2016.

# Calculation of Worker Sojourn Time in a Task's AOI

- Worker move at random direction with random velocity
- Smooth Random mobility mode to predict expected velocity,  $\hat{E}(v)$  and sojourn time,  $\mathcal{L}_t^m$  [65]



$$\mathcal{L}_t^m = \frac{\|A - l_m\|_2}{\hat{E}_m(v)}$$

[65] M. H. G. F. Asma Enayet, Md. Abdur Razzaque, "A mobility-aware optimal resource allocation architecture for big data task execution on mobile cloud in smart cities," IEEE Communications Magazine, 2017.



# Utility of a Worker



Mobility Based Utility

Distance Based Utility



Past Sensing Quality Based Utility


# Mobility Based Utility Calculation

Worker Device  
Selection

Worker Mobility  
Prediction

$$u_M = \begin{cases} 1 - e^{(d_m^t - \min(\mathcal{L}_m^t, \mathcal{D}_t))} & d_m^t < \min(\mathcal{L}_m^t, \mathcal{D}_t) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

- $d_m^t$  is the completion delay of task  $t$  by worker  $m$
- $\mathcal{D}_t$  is the delay deadline of task  $t$
- $\mathcal{L}_m^t$  is the sojourn time of worker  $m$  in the AOI of task  $t$



[36] J. Ren, Y. Zhang, K. Zhang, and X. S. Shen, "Sacrm: Social aware crowdsourcing with reputation management in mobile sensing," *Computer Communications*, vol. 65, pp. 55 - 65, 2015.





# Distance Based Utility Calculation

Worker Device  
Selection


Worker Mobility  
Prediction



- Further away the user is, less sensing quality it can provide.
  - Temperature, Wi-Fi signal Strength, etc.
- Can be modeled as:

Distance factor

$$U_D = \begin{cases} \left(1 - \frac{\|l_m - l_t\|_2}{r_t}\right)^\delta & \|l_m - l_t\|_2 \leq r_t, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$



# Location Based Utility Calculation




Combines  $U_M$  and  $U_D$  to define location based utility

$$U_{MD} = U_M \times U_D$$

**Worker with longer remaining lifetime and closer to the task center gives higher utility**

# Past Quality Based Utility Calculation



[37] B. Song, H. Shah-Mansouri, and V. W. S. Wong, "Quality of sensing aware budget feasible mechanism for mobile crowdsensing," *IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications*, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 3619-3631, June 2017.

# Combined Utility Calculation

- Now we calculate the combined utility of a worker  $m$  for performing task  $t$  as,

$$U_m^t = \alpha \times U_{MD} + (1 - \alpha) \times U_R$$

weighting factor ( $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$ )

# Profit of the Platform

- Profit of the Cloud Platform can be calculated as:

$$\mathcal{P}_m^t = V_m^t - C_m^t$$

Worker claimed cost    Monetary value of the task,  $V_m^t > 0$

- Now we calculate normalized profit as:

$$\rho_m^t = \frac{\mathcal{P}_m^t}{V^{max}}$$

where,  $0 \leq \rho_m^t \leq 1$  and  $V^{max} = \max_{t \in T} V_t$ .

# MONLP Problem Formulation

$$\mathcal{B}' = \operatorname{argmax}_{b \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{B})} \sum_{\forall \Gamma_m^t \in b} \{ \omega \times U_m^t + (1 - \omega) \times \rho_m^t \}$$

where,  $\omega$  ( $0 \leq \omega \leq 1$ )

$\omega = 1$   $\longrightarrow$  Utility maximization problem

$\omega = 0$   $\longrightarrow$  Profit maximization problem

$0 < \omega < 1$   $\longrightarrow$  Makes desired trade-off

# Constraints

$$\sum_{\forall \Gamma_m^t \in b} w_m^t \leq \mathcal{W}_t, \quad \forall t \in \mathcal{T} \longrightarrow \text{Workload constraint}$$

$$|\mathcal{B}' \cap \mathcal{B}_m| \leq n_m^{\max}, \quad \forall \Gamma_m^t \in b \longrightarrow \text{Maximum bid constraint}$$

$$U_{MD} > 0, \quad \forall \Gamma_m^t \in b, \forall t \in \mathcal{T} \longrightarrow \text{Worker availability constraint}$$

$$U_m^t \geq U_{th}^t, \quad \forall \Gamma_m^t \in b, \forall t \in \mathcal{T} \longrightarrow \text{Marginal utility constraint}$$


$$\rho_m^t \geq \rho_{th}^t, \quad \forall \Gamma_m^t \in b, \forall t \in \mathcal{T} \longrightarrow \text{Marginal profit constraint}$$




# Workload Allocation Problem is NP - Hard

- MONLP selects a subset  $b$  from  $P(B)$ , i.e.,  $b \in P(B)$  that maximizes the objective function satisfying given constraints.
  - Same as **maximum weight subset selection** problem
    - **NP-hard**

# Execution Time



(a) Number of tasks



(b) Number of workers

NEOS Optimization server (2x Intel Xeon E5-2698 @ 2.3GHz CPU and 92GB RAM)

# First-Fit Greedy Solutions

- First-Fit Utility Maximization (FFU): aims at maximizing utility while keeps profit in a marginal level.
- First-Fit Profit Maximization (FFP): profit is maximized while utility is kept in a marginal level.

# FFP Maximization Algorithm

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**Algorithm 1** First-Fit Utility Maximization Algorithm

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**INPUT:** Set of bids of all workers,  $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \bigcup_{\forall m \in \mathcal{M}} \mathcal{B}_m$

**OUTPUT:** Set of winning bids,  $\mathcal{B}'$

```

1:  $\mathcal{B}' \leftarrow \phi$ 
2: for all  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  do
3:    $n_m \leftarrow 0$ 
4: end for
5: for all  $t \in \mathcal{T}$  do
6:    $w_t \leftarrow 0, c_t \leftarrow 0$ 
7: end for
8: for all  $q \in \mathcal{B}$  do
9:   Calculate  $U_m^t, V_m^t$  and  $P_m^t$  using Eq. (8), (9) and (10),
   respectively
10: end for
11: Sort  $\mathcal{B}$  in descending order of  $U_m^t$ 
12: while ( $\mathcal{B} \neq \phi$ ) do
13:    $q \leftarrow$  First element of  $\mathcal{B}$ 
14:   if ( $P_m^t \geq P_{min}^t \ \&\& \ (W_t - w_t) \geq w_m^t \ \&\& \ n_m < n_m^{max}$ 
    $\ \&\& \ (V_t - c_t) \geq c_m^t$ ) then
15:      $\mathcal{B}' \leftarrow \mathcal{B}' \cup q$ 
16:      $w_t \leftarrow w_t + w_m^t, c_t \leftarrow c_t + c_m^t$ 
17:      $n_m \leftarrow n_m + 1$ 
18:   end if
19:    $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \mathcal{B} \setminus q$ 
20: end while
21: return  $\mathcal{B}'$ 

```

$$O(|\mathcal{M}|^2 \times |\mathcal{T}|^2)$$



# FFU Maximization Algorithm

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## Algorithm 2 First-Fit Profit Maximization Algorithm

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**INPUT:** Set of bids of all worker,  $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \bigcup_{\forall m \in \mathcal{M}} \mathcal{B}_m$

**OUTPUT:** Set of winning bids,  $\mathcal{B}'$

```


1:  $\mathcal{B}' \leftarrow \phi$ 
2: for all  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  do
3:    $n_m \leftarrow 0$ 
4: end for
5: for all  $t \in \mathcal{T}$  do
6:    $w_t \leftarrow 0, c_t \leftarrow 0$ 
7: end for
8: for all  $q \in \mathcal{B}$  do
9:   Calculate  $U_m^t, V_m^t$  and  $\mathcal{P}_m^t$  using Eq. (8), (9) and (10),
   respectively
10: end for
11: Sort  $\mathcal{B}$  in descending order of  $\mathcal{P}_m^t$ 
12: while ( $\mathcal{B} \neq \phi$ ) do
13:    $q \leftarrow$  First element of  $\mathcal{B}$ 
14:   if ( $U_m^t \geq U_{min}^t$  && ( $\mathcal{W}_t - w_t) \geq w_m^t$  &&  $n_m < n_m^{max}$ 
   && ( $V_t - c_t) \geq c_m^t$ ) then
15:      $\mathcal{B}' \leftarrow \mathcal{B}' \cup q$ 
16:      $w_t \leftarrow w_t + w_m^t, c_t \leftarrow c_t + c_m^t$ 
17:      $n_m \leftarrow n_m + 1$ 
18:   end if
19:    $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \mathcal{B} \setminus q$ 
20: end while
21: return  $\mathcal{B}'$ 

```

$$O(|\mathcal{M}|^2 \times |\mathcal{T}|^2)$$



# Worker Payment Policy



# Worker Payment Determination Algorithm

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## Algorithm 3 Determination of Payment Vector

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
**INPUT:** Set of winning bids,  $\mathcal{B}'$

**OUTPUT:** Payment vector,  $\mathcal{P}$

- 1:  $\mathcal{M}' \leftarrow \{m : q_m^t \in \mathcal{B}'\}$
  - 2: **for all**  $m \in \mathcal{M}'$  **do**
  - 3:      $\mathcal{P}_m \leftarrow 0$
  - 4: **end for**
  - 5: **for all**  $q \in \mathcal{B}'$  **do**
  - 6:     Calculate  $p_m^t$  using Eq. (19)
  - 7:      $\mathcal{P}_m \leftarrow \mathcal{P}_m + p_m^t$
  - 8: **end for**
  - 9: **return**  $\mathcal{P}$
- 

$$O(|\mathcal{M}| \times (|\mathcal{T}| + 1))$$

# Updating Quality Records



[53] Y. Li, Q. Li, J. Gao, L. Su, B. Zhao, W. Fan, and J. Han, "Conflicts to harmony: A framework for resolving conflicts in heterogeneous data by truth discovery," *IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering*, vol. 28, no. 8, pp. 1986-1999, Aug 2016.



# Performance Evaluation


- We carry out performance analysis of the proposed algorithms - **PQ-Trade** ( $\omega = 0.6$ ), **FFP** and **FFU** using **MATLAB** [67]
- Present comparative results with state-of-the-art works **SACRM** [36] and **MSC** [46]

**We hardly found any simulation tool for MCS system simulation**

[36] J. Ren, Y. Zhang, K. Zhang, and X. S. Shen, "Sacrm: Social aware crowdsourcing with reputation management in mobile sensing," *Computer Communications*, vol. 65, pp. 55 - 65, 2015.

[46] Z. Duan, M. Yan, Z. Cai, X. Wang, M. Han, and Y. Li, "Truthful incentive mechanisms for social cost minimization in mobile crowdsourcing systems," *Sensors*, vol. 16, no. 4, 2016.

# Simulation Environment



[69] Y. Zhu, Q. Zhang, H. Zhu, J. Yu, J. Cao and L. M. Ni, "Towards Truthful Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsourcing with Dynamic Smartphones," *2014 IEEE 34th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems*, Madrid, 2014, pp. 11-20.


# Simulation Parameters

Parameter	Value
Simulation area	$1000 \times 1000 \text{ m}^2$
Arrival rate of sensing tasks	2 ~ 8 tasks/sec
Arrival rate of worker devices	2 ~ 8 workers/sec
Workloads of task	1 ~ 7
Radius of task's AOI	20 ~ 150m
Task budget	5 ~ 15 units
Worker claimed cost	1 ~ 20 units
Task delay deadline	5 ~ 15s
Task completion time	1 ~ 20s
Worker mobility speed	4.5 ~ 7km/h
$U_{min}$	0.3
$P_{min}$	10%
$\alpha$	0.6
$\omega$	0.6
Simulation time	1000 Seconds


# Simulation Metrics

- **Profit of the platform**
  - Total amount of revenue received by the platform
- **Average utility per worker**
  - Ratio of total utility received from selected workers to total number of workers
- **Request service satisfaction**
  - Ratio of total number of completed workloads to total number of requested workloads
- **Standard deviation of sensing quality**
  - Average SD of quality of sensed data received from the selected workers
- **Average payment per worker**
  - Ratio of total payment of selected workers to total number of workers
- **Execution time**
  - Total time required to run worker selection and task allocation algorithms

# Impact of Varying Task Arrival Rates (1/3)




(a) Profit of the platform




(b) Average Utility per worker

Arrival rate of workers  
5 workers/sec

# Impact of Varying Task Arrival Rates (2/3)




(c) Request service satisfaction




(d) Standard deviation of sensing quality

Arrival rate of workers  
5 workers/sec

# Impact of Varying Task Arrival Rates (3/3)




(e) Average payment per worker



(f) Execution time

Arrival rate of workers  
5 workers/sec


# Impact of Varying Worker Arrival Rates (1/3)




Arrival rate of tasks  
5 tasks/sec



# Impact of Varying Worker Arrival Rates (2/3)




(c) Request service satisfaction




(d) Standard deviation of sensing quality

Arrival rate of workers  
5 workers/sec

# Impact of Varying Worker Arrival Rates (3/3)




(e) Average payment per worker



(f) Execution time


Arrival rate of workers  
5 workers/sec

# Impact of Varying Worker Velocities (1/2)




Arrival rate of tasks 5 tasks/sec  
Arrival rate of workers 5 workers/sec

# Impact of Varying Worker Velocities (2/2)



(c) Request service satisfaction




(d) Standard deviation of sensing quality


Unavailability of workers results in selecting poor quality workers

Arrival rate of tasks 5 tasks/sec  
Arrival rate of workers 5 workers/sec

# Impact of Varying Claimed Costs (1/2)




(a) Profit of the platform




(b) Average Utility per worker

Arrival rate of tasks 5 tasks/sec  
Arrival rate of workers 5 workers/sec

# Impact of Varying Claimed Costs (2/2)




(c) Request service satisfaction



(d) Average payment per worker


Arrival rate of tasks 5 tasks/sec  
Arrival rate of workers 5 workers/sec

# Impact of Varying $\omega$




Platform gives more weight to worker utility than its profit

# Impact of Varying $U_{min}$



(a) Profit of the platform




(b) Average utility per worker


Instead of profit, platform **maximizes worker utility**  
**violating design principle**



# Impact of Varying $P_{min}$



(a) Profit of the platform



(b) Average utility per worker

Instead of utility, platform **maximizes its profit**  
**violating design principle**

# Summery of the Thesis (1/2)

- Designed **workload allocation framework** for location aware MCS system.
- Worker **spacial and temporal availability** aware utility model
- **A MONLP optimization formulation** for allocating workload to maintain a reasonable **trade-off between quality and profit**, proven to **NP-hard**.

# Summery of the Thesis (2/2)

- Greedy solutions to avoid the complexity - **FFP**, **FFU** and **PQ-Trade ( $\omega$ )**
- FFP achieves **profit** as higher as **23.8%**
- FFU achieves **average utility** gain **2.29x**
- System's **service satisfaction** is **1.6x**
- PQ-Trade ( **$\omega = 0.6$** ) achieves profit as high as **17.21%** and utility gain **2.22x**
- Success of the system **highly depends on the system parameter setup**

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
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# Thank you for your patience





$u_M$



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$d_t^m$



